|
Title: |
|
Authors:
|
|
Abstract: This paper examines the fiduciary duties
of company directors in Ghana and the United Kingdom, two jurisdictions bound
together by a shared equitable inheritance yet separated by strikingly
different reform histories. Ghana codified directors' duties as early as 1963,
on the recommendation of Professor L. C. B. Gower, more than four decades
before the United Kingdom attempted the same exercise in the Companies Act
2006. The study pursues three questions: whether the content and structure of
the duties in the two systems converge; how the jurisdictions differ in their
standard of care, stakeholder orientation and enforcement machinery; and what
each system might usefully borrow from the other. A doctrinal research approach
is adopted, supplemented by the functional method of comparative law and, where
the analysis reaches enforcement, by publicly reported regulatory and
enforcement evidence. The primary materials are the Companies Act, 2019 (Act
992) of Ghana, the Companies Act 2006 of the United Kingdom, and the case law
of both jurisdictions, read alongside leading scholarly commentary and the
recent debate on corporate purpose, stakeholder governance and legal
transplants. The main findings of the study demonstrate that (i) the
substantive core of the duties, loyalty, good faith, proper purpose and the
avoidance of conflicts, is remarkably convergent, reflecting a common equitable
root; (ii) the jurisdictions diverge in the architecture of the duty of care
and in stakeholder framing, with section 172 of the UK Act mandating regard to
non-shareholder interests while the Ghanaian formulation remains
company-centred and largely permissive; and (iii) the sharpest divergence lies
not in the substance of the duties but in the channel and visibility of their
enforcement, the United Kingdom relying on a mix of private litigation and a
high-volume, publicly reported disqualification regime while Ghana enforces
substantially through sectoral regulation and the criminal law, which generate
little reported company-law precedent. Drawing on regulatory and enforcement
data as well as the case law, the study cautions against treating the scarcity
of reported Ghanaian decisions as straightforward proof of weaker enforcement,
and offers reform recommendations for both systems. DOI: https://doi.org/10.51505/IJEBMR.2026.10807 |
|
PDF Download |