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Abstract: This article analyzes the rise of geoeconomic competition and the process by which economic instruments have become strategically central to foreign policy in the global power struggle. During the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the international system has undergone a fundamental transformation in power politics, with sanctions, technology controls, energy dependencies, and supply chain management assuming decisive roles in interstate relations. Drawing on the weaponized interdependence theory as its core analytical framework, this study examines how actors controlling critical nodes of global economic networks transform this control into foreign policy leverage. Designed as an analytical essay, this research employs an integrated methodological approach combining literature synthesis, conceptual framing, and comparative pattern analysis. The central hypothesis posits that the strategic centralization of economic instruments accelerates during periods when network dependencies become asymmetric and critical sectors undergo securitization. Findings reveal that geoeconomic competition intensifies across four principal domains: sanctions and financial systems, technology and export controls, energy and climate policies, and investment screening and standards. The study demonstrates that while economic coercion— —instruments can produce effective outcomes in the short term, they may trigger counter-adaptation strategies, the emergence of alternative networks, and tendencies toward institutional fragmentation in the medium and long term. In this era marked by the questioning of the liberal international order's fundamental assumptions and the recognition that economic interdependence generates coercive capacity alongside cooperation, geoeconomic competition deepens the tension between integration and fragmentation in the global order. By evaluating both the effectiveness and legitimacy dimensions of geoeconomic strategy, this article aims to contribute to academic literature and policy practice alike. DOI: https://doi.org/10.51505/IJEBMR.2026.1207 |
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