
ON THE ISSUE OF DISSEMINATION AND UTILIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR BORDER SECURITY BY THE NIGERIA CUSTOMS SERVICE

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Abstract

The task of regulating the activities along the nation's border and ensuring national security calls for designing and redesigning security architect particularly in dissemination and utilization of intelligence among the security agencies and in the Nigeria Customs Service (NCR). The prevalence of violence in Nigeria and illegal inflow of arms, drugs and persons informed the need to examine the dissemination and utilization of intelligence, its implication on national security and the challenges associated with it. The paper was descriptive and combined primary and secondary sources of data collection. The primary source adopted questionnaire while the secondary combined interview and available materials. The study found that NCS relied largely on human intelligence, while there was weak cooperation between the NCR and other security agencies which in turn negatively affected dissemination and utilization of intelligence with grave implications of national security. In dissemination and utilization of intelligence, the NCR was largely guided by the relevance, timeliness and trustworthiness of the intelligence. Challenges associated with dissemination and utilization of intelligence included poor technological development, jealousy and lack of trust. The study recommended that the NSC should endeavour to improve the relationship between it and other security agencies while the poor network of communication equipment should be attended to and for the borders to be properly manned to checkmate illegal inflow of banned and dangerous items to ensure national security.

Keywords: Intelligence, Intelligence Dissemination and Intelligence Utilization, Border, Border Security, Nigeria Customs Service.

Introduction

Intelligence dissemination and utilization constitutes the hallmark of Intelligence cycle, which is a combination of cyclical processes that are deemed necessary from conceptualization to its final utilization. It is however important to note that different intelligence cycles have been designed by security agencies all over the world to meet specific purposes. Stokes (2013) recalled that it was first adopted by the U.S. Army which was as a result of the attempt to establish the first intelligence guideline through the distribution of Intelligence Regulations. This led to viewing intelligence collection *as the procuring, assembling and organizing of information and served as the first step in the processing of intelligence information* (Bigelow, 2012). The third phase according to Stokes, (2013:41) is largely focused on utilization of sources of information by

collection agencies and delivery of information to the proper intelligence-processing unit that will eventually convert it to intelligence report

The event of September 11, 2001 attack led to a further call for the review of intelligence processes to ensure an enhanced integrated intelligence cycle process. It invariably led to placing importance on components of the intelligence cycle such as intelligence dissemination and utilization.. For Metscher and Gilbride (2005:3) therefore view intelligence dissemination and utilization as is “a product created through the process of collecting, collating, and analyzing data, for dissemination as usable information that typically assesses events, locations or adversaries, to allow the appropriate deployment of resources to reach the desired outcome”

The dynamism of global security challenges has the tendency to influence the way in which threats security threat are processed and interpreted. These threats are geographically unbounded and cannot all be countered through military or security means alone. Caveltly and Mauer (2009) therefore observed that the new threats in the global system are dominated by three interrelated characteristics, which are complexity, uncertainty and a diminishing impact of geographical space. It cannot but be appreciated that increased complexity results in increased uncertainty while uncertainty leads to the demand for information to checkmate security threats in the global system, at the national levels and in particular along the border.

As the importance of national borders become challenged and expose the vulnerability of the nation, new security order could not but be anticipated particularly the transnational threats through criminal elements such as terrorists, armed banditry, human traffickers, illegal drug trafficking and armed importation. This implication therefore that apart from the collaborative efforts by the domestic security agencies, transnational security network is imperative which led Hutton (2010) to opine that the transnational nature of security and the diversity of the security challenges have driven intelligence cooperation to a higher priority.

It is however worrisome that intelligence dissemination and utilization is the most neglected aspect of intelligence cycle across the world in which Nigeria is not an exception’ With increasing globalization of security and the perceived neglect in intelligence dissemination and utilization of the intelligence circle in Nigeria Customs Service The study set to examine factors influencing intelligence dissemination and utilization along the border post, Nigeria, determine the implications of intelligence dissemination and utilization for national security in Nigeria and the challenges associated with intelligence dissemination and utilization in the Nigeria Customs Service,

The paper is descriptive and combined a mixed method relying on primary and secondary sources of data. The population of the study consisted of intelligent Units of Nigeria Customs Service, Nigerian Army, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Immigration Service, National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control and Standard Organization of Nigeria (SON) while the sample technique is purposive because of the peculiarity of the subjective matter involving Intelligence services (CIU). The sample size of 178 was drawn from the population as the nature of the respondent make a fix figure of the

population difficult to obtain. The instrument for the study was questionnaire for the quantitative aspect while response rate for the copies of questionnaire administered was 80 per cent (142copies). The analysis was thematically done using SPSS 10.

For qualitative aspect of the paper, secondary data were collected from relevant books, articles, journals, newsletters, publications from Nigeria Customs Services websites, as well as publications from the websites of other sister agencies. Oral interview was also conducted among the CIU officers for the purpose of eliciting firsthand information.

Literature Review or Conceptual Review

Security could be viewed from a state of being or an experience of safety from danger. Wehmeier and Ashby, 2002) perceive Security as protection of a nation and its citizens and their property from event that might occur in future to threaten their wellbeing as well as those that might affect the current existence. In effect, Mroz (1991) views security as a state of being relatively free from harm or threats of harm. National security therefore implies the maintenance of the survival of the state by applying political, economic, diplomatic powers among others and these could be simultaneously applied to achieve specific result.

The original notion of national security was largely revolving around acquisition of arms and ammunition by nations for the preservation of national sovereignty, guarantee territorial integrity and ensure internal stability while element of coercive force predominated the reasoning. The experience of 9/11 added to the rethinking in respect of the concept of national security in a complex globalized world and the interdependency nature of the global system. The dynamics in the global system informed the need to put other factors into consideration in dealing with the issue of National security. Such factors include the population explosion, the increasing disparities between the rich and the poor energy challenges, environmental and worsening economic and political crises as well as violence orchestrated by state and non-state actor such as in terrorism, herdsmen attacks among numerous others.

Border security is a component of national security. It becomes imperative that every nation must ensure the protection and security of its borders as the gateway into the nation. With specific reference to Nigeria, the nation is saturated with pockets of violence which makes it a gateway or destination of illegal or prohibited production. The role of the Nigeria Customs in this regard is that of ensuring that prohibited good would not enter into the nation and to ensure that the correct tariff is paid for legal items.

The danger to which the nation is exposed informed Babalola (2018) to observe that there were 84 approved borders in Nigeria and 1400 illegal borders. The implication is partly what has been witnessed such as the as reported in the This Day (2018) reported on the seizure of 3200 bags containing 50 kilograms of rice each, frozen poultry products of 1000 cartons, 720 25 Kilograms of vegetable oils and many bales of second hand clothing which could have attracted custom duty of fifty-four million, four hundred and sixty-five thousand naira only (N 54, 465, 000.00). The same source revealed the seizure of a total of 21.5 million arms and Ammunition shipped illegally into Nigeria between 2010 and 2017. In November 2010, 21,407 live ammunition was

intercepted at Apapa port while in September, 1100 pump action guns were seized at Tin-Can port in Lagos. With the onslaught of Boko Haram and herdsmen violence as well as other sectarian violence, border security is not negotiable. This then makes the issue of decentralization and utilization of intelligence central to national security.

According to FAS (1996), intelligence is defined as “information about "things foreign" that is not available to the Government through conventional means-in other words, to information collected by "secret" or clandestine means”. The same source went further to note that the “four functional roles for intelligence agencies-collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence-as well as a number of "missions" in terms of providing substantive support to particular governmental functions”. Therefore, a discussion on intelligence could not be sufficient without its circle.

The understanding of intelligence cycle is essential for a meaning discussion of intelligent dissemination and utilization. Stokes (2013) described the various components of as planning, directing, collecting, processing, exploitation, analysis and production as well as dissemination, consumption, evaluation and feedback process. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) views intelligence cycle as “the process of developing unrefined data into polished intelligence for the use of policymakers”. Dissemination is distribution of raw or finished intelligence to the consumers whose information needs brought about the intelligence requirements. This process can followed up through the use of Reports, Bulletins, and Assessments. It should be noted that disseminated intelligence usually influences decisions, hence ensuring that new requirements are created, thereby repeating the processes in the intelligence cycle.

In other word, dissemination of intelligence is a process by which those who initiated the requirements or who had a gap that needed to be filled in order to achieve strategic edge over a target receive the intelligence product. Hence, Olalikan (2013), Firester (2011) and Lowenthal (2002) argued that intelligence dissemination and utilization are indispensable in the intelligence process or cycle. According to Bartes (2013), dissemination is carried out based on rules that are designed to protect the secrecy of the intelligence, hence each copy of the report is numbered and the level of classification indicated. The secrecy associated with intelligence dissemination and utilization led Chalk (2004) to observe that it brings about intelligence failure as a result of inaccessibility of intelligence at the appropriate time as this is usually associated with the need to protect the report and fear of exposure and trust could not be eliminated. However, security agencies beyond the national boundaries cannot but exchange security information in a cooperative and efficient manner to prevent security breaches. Hence, security agencies globally need to exchange sensitive information with other security agencies for more intelligence cooperation and efficiency.

It is an incontrovertible fact that dissemination in the intelligence process involves the provision of intelligence products to the right or appropriate users, in an understandable format, at the right time and through a secured means. It is therefore imperative that caution must be applied to ensure to curb an overload of information or delivery of the wrong information to non-intended

or dangerous recipient, as poor or unguarded channelization of information could lead to unimaginable consequences. With specific reference to border security, information in security format covering the smuggler route and their networking, the goods often illegally move across the border, the perpetrators and the means of beating the security posts should be processed, analyzed and pass across the security agencies. The use of spies particularly at the point of loading probably in the neighboring country while exchange of the intelligence should be regularly exchanged with the neighboring nation security agencies. Hence, this calls for trust and confidentiality as to make the dissemination of information without hitch.

On the other hand, utilization of intelligence information involves obtaining feedback from the policy maker about the value of the intelligence supplied so that further collection or analysis of information may be undertaken or so that the strategies for intelligence production and dissemination reviewed as the case may be. According to Resendez (2013), intelligence utilization is based on a group of factors the impulse of the intelligence system by upper level management as an integral part of the organization and the decision – making process. In addition, the quality and usability of the generated information is important while the level of trust or distrust towards the agency sharing the intelligence cannot be over stretched.

On the other hand, Stokes (2013) sees dissemination and utilization of intelligence as the final stage of intelligence cycle or process in which final written analysis is given to a policymaker, who initiated the activities in the intelligence cycle (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).

A brief look at the different types of intelligence cycles earlier mentioned shows that dissemination and utilization is principally the final step in the intelligence cycle/process and this makes the stage a very critical stage in the intelligence cycle. The vast majority of military strategists agree with the importance of intelligence as a decisive factor during the planning and execution of successful operations (Department of Defence, 2007). The intelligence process in most cases consists of five phases: Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis and dissemination. All these stages are meant to be of very equal importance; however most analyses concerning the process are required to improve the intelligence process which concentrates mainly on the collection phase of the cycle, while leaving the intelligence dissemination phase as the most disadvantaged in the entire cycle (Negulescu, 2011).

Negulescu (2011) argues that in terms of intelligence dissemination and utilization, a number of issues may reduce the efficiency of the intelligence cycle. Firstly, is the suspicion and hesitations held by one or more of the Agencies to share intelligence because of the very high price for which such intelligence has been obtained. Secondly, is the high degree of information sensitivity which sometimes limits access to certain information to members only making it difficult or impossible for non – members to have access or due to information's degree of confidentiality, impossible to share with non – members, Thirdly is the receivers perception of the quality of the intelligence might be diminished by the very large amount of information, thus making them incomprehensible to the un-initiated. The receiver's capability to process it might make such information contradictory. This calls for the creation of an architecture capable of not

just housing/warehousing the information, but processing it into more comprehensible language for all parties to blend along.

Moreover, Lowenthal (2006) notes that the following questions must be taken into consideration during the intelligence dissemination phase. Firstly, from the many information collected, what is important enough to report? Secondly, to which policy makers should it be reported? To many, or to few? Thirdly, how quickly should it be reported? Fourthly, how much detail should be reported to the various intelligence consumers? Fifthly, what is the best vehicle for reporting it? A memo, a briefing or what? These questions are the determinants of how the dissemination/utilization phase can function.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts Thomas Kilmann's conflict mode instrument (TKI) which was developed in 1976. The theory defines individual's behaviour along five specific modes, which was based upon the two separate dimensions of cooperation and assertiveness: competing is assertive and uncooperative, collaborating is assertive and cooperative, avoiding is unassertive and uncooperative, accommodating is unassertive and cooperative, and compromising is intermediate in both cooperatives and assertiveness.


Cooperation and assertiveness relates to the relationship that should exists between law enforcement agencies like the Nigeria customs service and other stakeholders at the Borders Local Community etc. While the NCS is expected to cooperate with the Border Community, she is also expected to assert herself in line with her statutory functions in situations where laws are being breached. Also, competing comes into play where law Enforcement Agencies refuse to see themselves as partners in progress but as competitors such as the smugglers and human, drug and arms traffickers. The theory has a tendency of leading to a win-win outcome amongst stakeholders, while also reinforcing mutual trust and respect. Also, the theory has the potential of building a foundation for effective collaboration amongst parties' agencies in the nearest future with profound implications for thoroughness in intelligence dissemination and utilization.

However, Thomas and Kilmann's theory has the following identified weaknesses. Firstly, the theory requires a commitment from all parties which it takes for granted, before a mutually acceptable solution or resolution could be arrived at amongst all parties. Secondly, the process of cooperation, accommodating, assertiveness takes a lot of time and energy and may not be as easy. Thirdly, the process of collaborating may not be practical when timing is crucial and a quick solution is required. Fourthly, and lastly is that some Agencies may decide to take advantage of other agencies that desire to collaborate. This may negatively affect the agencies confidence and self-esteem in situations when firm enforcement actions are required.

Presentation of Data and Discussion of Findings

The figure below is the data obtained from 142 respondents as thematically presented

Fig. 1: Factors Nigeria Customs Service consider during Dissemination and Utilization of Intelligence



Source: Field Data, 2018. N= 142

The one hundred and forty-two copies of questionnaire retrieved were analyzed based on frequency percentage and two-scaled response of Yes and No. It was discovered that the most prominent factors considered during dissemination and utilization of intelligence by the Nigeria Customs Service were: relevance of the Intelligence (n= 101, 71.1 per cent), timeliness of intelligence (n= 87, 61.3per cent), accuracy of the intelligence (n= 80, 56.3 per cent), trustworthiness of the Intelligence (n= 79, 55.6 per cent) and trustworthiness of the recipient (n= 76, 53.5 per cent).

The data above revealed that the relevance of the intelligence was considered to be of utmost importance in the Custom Services. There is no doubt that an array of data could be accessible or available to the agencies, some might be directly relevant to the Customs while others might be for the consideration of other agencies. In addition, the timeliness of the intelligence was of next importance as expired intelligence could not meet the need of the agency though it could provide a guide against the future. However, institutional culture and varying capacity of the agencies were of east significance.

Deconde (2002) argues that regardless of whether all other stages in the intelligence cycle were well executed, intelligence that is not disseminated or utilized will be counter – productive or injurious to the system. Failure in this very important phase of the intelligence cycle is

tantamount to missing the purpose of the entire intelligence cycle. Similarly, the study also validated the findings by Vanotten (2005) that agencies having different intelligence cultures are usually reluctant towards disseminating intelligence amongst themselves due to the potential for tension and misunderstanding occasioned by superiority – inferiority complex. However, this finding did not support the claim made by Vanotten (2005) based on the 9/11 that it is mandatory for Agencies to collaborate more with each other as the emphases in this study that were for utmost consideration were relevance of the Intelligence, timeliness of intelligence, accuracy of the intelligence, trustworthiness of the Intelligence and trustworthiness of the recipient. However, superiority and inferiority elements as well as lack of trust in one and the other by the security agencies could hinder effective dissemination and utilization of intelligence. However, of important is the fact that without intelligence dissemination, there cannot be intelligence utilization. There is no gainsaying that optimum intelligence utilization is highly germane to border security of any nation.

The findings above was corroborated by the oral interview conducted which revealed that Nigeria Customs Service aside from gathering intelligence, always consider its relevance in terms of agency, team or person that require the intelligence before disseminating or utilizing intelligence. It was revealed that there was a risk of losing one's life when disseminating intelligence and one officer from Customs Service said that "by the time you give intelligence and the person who has this consignment has gotten information that you are the one who provided it; then your life is at risk". There is no gainsaying that dissemination and utilization of intelligence is the hallmark of intelligence service as observed by Bartes (2013) but lack of trust among others as noted by Chalk (2004) accounted for intelligence failure not only in the Nigeria Customs Service but among other security agencies across the world.

Implications of Intelligence Dissemination and Utilization for National Security in Nigeria

The primary goal of intelligence globally is to provide the needed information to policymakers which are expected to assist in shedding light on lines of action or decision option available in specific situations. This explains why Clapper (1995) opined that its purpose is that of "eliminating or reducing uncertainty for government decision-makers". To achieve this, intelligence is expected to be accurate, comprehensive and timely. It is an acknowledged fact that intelligence alone cannot necessarily win war and ensure national security but it has the tendency to support operational strategy in decision making and minimize losses.

Since dissemination and utilization consists of providing Intelligence reports and the usage decision makers which should be given to the right consumer, in an understandable form, at the appropriate time and through a secure channel, no nation could survive and progress without intelligence (Johnson, 2010). Every policy maker relies on security report as to inform the direction of its internal and external policies. In addition, intelligence dissemination and utilization are parts of the processes in intelligence circle. If intelligence is gathered without these two additional steps, to a large extent, it will be an exercise in futility. Furthermore, in a globalized society, intelligence is essential to develop appropriate policies to deal with external

aggressors and the internal criminal element and to discover probable collaboration between external and internal aggressors.

Intelligence dissemination and utilization is invaluable to derive adequate gains from global economic and financial transaction Nnoli (2006). The detail information of each nation's technical, financial, commercial strength is essential to develop strategy to benefit from global business and this explain the maxim that information is wealth. Intelligence in this sense will enable the nation to keep an eye on the activities of multinational companies and foreign business and economic interest that will not constitute security challenges and enables the nation to derive maximum gains.

Without intelligence dissemination and utilization, covert actions which are broadly used to influence political, military and the economic conditions in other nations will be very difficult to achieve (Johnson, 2010). The same is true of Counterintelligence which is primarily directed at protecting the nation and the security agencies from the action and inactions of foreign intelligence services. The ability of the nation to adequately deploy its security agencies and the availability of intelligence in terms of dissemination and utilization will determine the degree of success in their effort to make the nation secure

The security of a nation is not only a function of the personnel available but the services that should be rendered. The global society is loaded with security challenges such as countering terrorism, arms proliferation, drugs and human trafficking. All these activities are perpetrated along the border. It is public information that the Customs Service made a seizure of Tramadol, a restricted and prohibited drug worth \$73 billion late November 2018 so also the seizure of arms as reported by This Day (2107). The implication is that the health and security of the nation is at risk without effective and timely dissemination of intelligence.

Challenges of Intelligence Dissemination and Utilization for National Security with Specific Reference to Nigeria Customs Service in Nigeria

There is no nation that is free from its own group of challenges with intelligence dissemination and utilization. As earlier noted in respect of the nature of Nigeria borders with over 1400 illegal point of entry, as much as intelligence could have enhance the security of the border, as Ilogho (2008) rightly noted, many of the point along the border are not connected by communication as the network providers have not been able to cover the whole nation effectively. If the communication network is challenged, timely dissemination of intelligence could not be guaranteed as noted by Ebulue, (2007). This was further confirmed by significant majority of the security officers interviewed and that there are also no alternative secured means of passing sensitive intelligence and therefore to rely on manual processes which may make the report outdated or late to prevent the occurrence of certain events.

In a nation like Nigeria, the reliability of many report even at the disposal of the Nigeria Customs Services as there is tendency by security agencies to access information that has make attempt to

support the whim and caprices of the political class at the expense of objective reporting of events. The implication is that such intelligence could not be able to produce good policies required for engaging specific challenges. The issue is made complicated as the political leaders may not be prepared to listen to the truth. This was noted by Hughes (1974) President Lyndon B. Johnson disregarded intelligence when he received an unfavorable news in respect of the war in Vietnam in the 1960s.

The low level of technological knowhow among security agencies could be a challenge in terms of dissemination and utilization intelligence. The development globally has shown that every individual particularly the security personnel should be computer literate and be able to use modern technological gadgets. This align with the position of Wali (2010) that the invention of security gadget such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) if available could have assisted greatly in the process of intelligence gathering, collection processes, dissemination and utilization while there would be less reliance on human intelligence (HUMINT).

Babatunde (2009) therefore perceived the inadequacies of coordination and sharing of information between agencies due to low technological knowledge of security agencies Musa (2013) noted that this to a large extent reduced the capacity of the Nigeria Customs Service as well as other sister agencies in border management system of the country as equipment like utility vehicles, surveillance helicopters and personnel with technological knowhow are short in supply (Sahara Reporters, 2013). This explains why Petraeus (2007) observed that this might explain the likelihood errors occurring in the process of dissemination and utilization as these two steps constitute important stages in intelligence cycle.

Prominent among the challenges of information dissemination and utilization is that of overload of information or handing over of information that might not be completely true. If the process of filtering or analyzing information is not rigorous and detail, policy maker may be misled as this was reflected significantly in the interview conducted. In another sense, information that is meant for custom may be made available to immigration or the Nigeria police. The implication is that in a situation that there is no regular exchange of intelligence, such might just be discarded no matter how important it may be. In addition, the practice whereby retired office from one security agency is made to head another one might not be healthy enough in information dissemination and utilization. For instance, the current Nigeria Customs Service is a retired Military officer, their attitude and reaction to issue might and loyalty may reflect that of former discipline (FAS Intelligent Resource Program, 1996).

There is also the challenge of scarcity of Social Media Intelligence (SMI or SOCMINT) Okereke (2016) argued the social media space is loaded with counterproductive news such as the activities of the terrorist and other form of crime that persistently send fear to readers while no suc platform by government or security agencies to showcase their gains. This explains why the following foreign intelligence agencies: FBI (US), CIA (US), MOSSAD (Israel), GCHQ (UK), MI6 (UK), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki) (SVR),

the French foreign intelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), amongst others, all have online presence and are active on social media.

More so, Okereke (2016) saw the issue of poor funding as a pervading threat to the success of intelligence dissemination and utilization in Nigeria. It is debatable as to whether or not the Nigerian military and security agencies are well funded or not. Although our military spending is paltry compared to that of the western world, but if juxtaposed with other African countries, Nigeria does not fare poorly in military spending. To give us an idea, Global Fire Power index suffices. In 2016, while Egypt with an annual defense budget of slightly above \$4b billion was ranked first in Africa, the Global Fire Power (GFP) Index ranked Nigeria (\$2.3 billion defense budget) 44th out of 126 countries in the world and 4th out of 30 African countries with the highest military strength and firepower. To put this in perspective, same index ranked Ghana 19th in Africa, Cameroon 20th, Kenya 11th, and Tanzania 17th and so on and so forth.

Moreover, corruption could be seen as a serious challenge in intelligence dissemination and utilization. The *Premium Times Newspaper* (2015) reported that Nigeria spent N4.62 trillion on National Security in the last 5 years, yet widespread insecurity remains". The pervasive corruption could not have led to Nigeria's security budgets privately appropriated by politicians and top military officers (*Sahara Report*, 2015). The Guardian (2015) quoting the reports of the Federal Government Investigation reports on Arms Deal noted that:

513 contracts awarded at \$8,356,525,184.32; N2, 189,265,724,404.55 and €54,000.00, fifty-three (53) were failed contracts amounting to \$2,378,939,066.27 and N13, 729,342,329.87 respectively. The report further noted that payments to the tune of N3, 850,000,000.00 (Three Billion, Eight Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) were made to a single company without documented evidence of contractual agreements or fulfillment of tax obligations to the Federal Government of Nigeria.

(See Thewillnigeria.com, Nov 17, 2015 and African News Service, Dec. 21, 2015)

The above was just a tip in the iceberg as various reports revealed that most of the resources were shared among the politician. Massive allegations of misappropriation of budgetary allocation for defense led Omonobi (2015) to conclude that the military were still using obsolete hardware and unserviceable equipment which cannot but hinder intelligence dissemination and utilization apart from deployment and operation of the ground forces.

Also, scholars like Adekanye (1998), Wali (2010), Odoma (2014), Okereke (2016) and Adaramodu (2016) had identified issues such as unhealthy inter-agency rivalry and lack of synergy or information sharing which had sowed seeds of mutual distrusts especially in the conduct of intelligence and security operations. In Nigeria different security agencies have been accused of placing self-aggrandizement above national interest Adaramodu (2016). This was further confirmed during Inter-agency Peace-building Conference organized by the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, NSCDC, in Abuja, in 2013 where the security agencies present noted that "lack of collaboration amongst the security agencies is one of the factors responsible for the growth of Boko Haram" (*Daily Sun*, 2013). The then National Security

Adviser, NSA, Col Sambo Dasuki (rtd), also asserted that “It is pertinent to note that this lack of collaboration among our security agencies was one of the factors that permitted the growth and, until recently, the success of Boko Haram terrorist attacks.”

Another pertinent challenge in intelligence dissemination and utilization is that the security architect in Nigeria is reactionary and not proactive in nature. This was noted by *The Nation Newspaper* (2017) that Nigeria’s security agents only “react to crisis but do not prevent”. This is corroborated by *The Guardian Newspaper* (2009:4) in respect of taking appropriate and timely action against Mohammed Yusuf on November 13, 2008 which led to the growth of Boko Haram

Indeed, Inter-agency rivalry constitutes an inherent challenge of intelligence dissemination and utilization along border post in Nigeria. According to Omogui (2006:66), agency rivalry is a state of competition, contention or emulation that existed within and between agencies for something of perceived value to the contending interest. Bagdanos (2004) and Adekanye (1998) contends that rivalry could be due to differing individual perspectives, new strategic concept, powerful functional and regional orientations, and technological initiatives, with each having differing force structure implications. In such a situation, the trust and confidence required in processing security information will be lacking

Conclusion

The paper concluded that the security of the border could not be isolated from national security which implied that security architect must be subjected to the dynamics local needs and global trend particularly in Nigeria dominated with persistent violence and increasing record of inflow of illegal arms among other prohibited items. This made poor dissemination and utilization of intelligence a serious set-back within the NCS and among other security agencies and the need to redesign security architect to give dissemination and utilization of intelligence its rightful place as to enhance national security.

Recommendations

The study recommended that:

1. The Nigeria Customs Service needs to design its own identifiable intelligence cycle which gives credence to its peculiarities while also noting the importance of designing a model that is adaptable to changes especially in terms of complex intelligence environment which may not necessarily follow sequential order.
2. Advanced online and social media technology that will permeate the distribution of Intelligence as widely as possible, so that it can be evaluated and commented upon by experts other than the collectors themselves for accuracy and efficiency.
3. Attention should be drawn to deploying other sources of intelligence which will complement the major sources relied on by NCS for its operations (open source and human source). These other sources recommended are imageries (IMINT), signal (SIGINT) communication (COMINT) and electronic (ELINT), which the NCS lacked and conversely are relied on by Customs Administrations world of developed nations.

Adopting these will help to place the NCS strategically ahead of all its targets and will be able to anticipate adversaries and protect the Nigeria's border better.

4. The government must set in motion the ways of enhancing the cooperation among the security agencies to minimize jealousy, lack of trust and other human weaknesses as to place national interest above personal or agency's interest.
5. The government should encourage network provider to expand their national coverage to assist in dissemination and utilization of intelligence.
6. Efforts to be intensified to enhance or further encourage the sharing of information between the nation's security agencies and those of other nations.

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