

**BORDER SECURITY, THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND ITS
ADAPTABILITY BY THE NIGERIA CUSTOMS SERVICE**

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Abstract

Intelligence cycle is an integral aspect of intelligence security system due to its cyclical processes which is all embracing particularly from intelligence conceptualization, collection, analysis, production, dissemination to utilization. These concepts largely constitute the core components of intelligence cycle processes, and they are intricately linked and interdependent with regard to border security maintenance and national security interest of any given nation. Also, the interdependent nature of intelligence cycle processes is rooted in the increasing trans-nationalization of security threats along border posts and the new global demand for more cooperation and coordination among security agencies. However, the consistent variations in the intelligence cycle working definitions have become profound through the existence of different scholarly views both on its concept and practicability across the world. This study therefore is important because it is an attempt at examining intelligence cycle model being employed by the Customs Intelligence Unit (CIU) of the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS). Thus, it concludes that intelligence cycle operations, dynamism and challenges can best be understood in its specific context, be it Nigeria or other countries in the world. On this basis, the study adopts both qualitative and quantitative approach in its data analysis.

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Keywords: Intelligence cycle, Border security, Customs intelligence Unit, Nigeria Customs Service.

Introduction

Intelligence cycle is a combination of cyclical processes that are deemed necessary from the conceptualization of the necessity of intelligence to its final utilization. Intelligence cycles are designed by organizations especially those with security objectives in order to concretely ascertain steps that would be taken in the process of intelligence gathering, processing and use of actionable knowledge for gaining strategic edge over targets. It is however important to note that different intelligence cycles have been designed by security agencies all over the world. According to Stokes (2013), the intelligence cycle was first adopted by the U.S. Army. This move was as a result of the Army Chief of Staff's attempt to establish the first intelligence guideline through the distribution of Intelligence Regulations. After this, in 1952, intelligence collection was defined as the procuring, assembling and organizing of information and served as the first step in the processing of intelligence information (Bigelow, 2012). However, "it is now the third phase in the intelligence cycle ...officially defined as the exploitation of sources of

information by collection agencies and delivery of information to the proper intelligence-processing unit for use in the production of intelligence” (Stokes, 2013:41).

After September 11, 2001 attack, there was a renewed call for the review of intelligence processes and to bring about a more integrated intelligence cycle process model. This brought about a renewed focus on the importance of components of the intelligence cycle (Bigelow, 2012). The basic intelligence cycle process showed serialized steps that are important for assembling information so as to have expected understanding and enlightenment about the linkage between intelligence and border security. Young (2018) has affirmed that the process of intelligence analysis has over the years evolved to include multiple agencies, which efforts in intelligence networking and sharing cannot be downplayed. Thus, as the intelligence community grew, so did the needs of the participating agencies. He further attributed the variations in the intelligence cycle models to the bi-product of agency-specific interpretations and needs. It is on this basis, the study examines the model of intelligence cycle in existence in the Nigeria Customs Service and its inherent challenges.

Statement of the Problem

Intelligence cycle no doubt constitute the anchor model for intelligence operations across the world (Bartes, 2013). Yet, it has evolved over the years with diverse complexities in its components, and variations in its model (Hutton, 2010 and Young, 2018). This has constituted a big challenge to the working concepts of intelligence cycle and its operations as divergent views continued to be maintained by scholars. For instance, in analyzing the concept of intelligence cycle, Johnston (2008) has maintained that:

The Intelligence Cycle is represented visually to provide an easy-to-grasp and easy-to-remember representation of a complex process. Although this type of representation may make the flow of information and the interrelationships of steps easy to identify, it does not indicate who or what may affect the completion of a step or the resources needed to begin the next step. In its concise form, then, the visual representation of the Intelligence Cycle is reduced to a map of information handling. Without explicit descriptions of the steps in the process or the benefit of prior knowledge, it can raise questions of accuracy and completeness and can occasion misconceptions, particularly concerning the roles and responsibilities of intelligence analysts. (Johnson, 2008:2)

More importantly, some scholars have also argued against the practicability of intelligence cycle processes. This paper therefore asserts that intelligence cycle can best be understood from a nation’s operational environment or context in spite of whatever adaptations from other regions locally or globally. Hence with specific focus on the CIU of Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), the study profoundly explored intelligence cycles processes and its inherent challenges.

Objective of the Study

This study investigates the pragmatism of intelligence cycle in the Nigeria Customs Service and its implication for national security in Nigeria. Therefore, the study examines the working concept of intelligence cycle with regard to border security and challenges within the NCS, how it impacts on national security, as well as proffer solutions which could enhance positive results as regard national security interests. Explicitly, the objectives of the study are:

1. To examine the practice of intelligence cycle in the Nigeria Customs Service,
2. To enumerate the inherent challenges of intelligence cycle in the Nigeria Customs Service.

Scope of the Study

The subject scope of the study focuses on issues as regard intelligence cycle and border security in the NCS. In this wise, the Customs Intelligence Unit (CIU) is purposely selected so as to explore profoundly their place in intelligence cycle processes. The CIU is a unit of officers and men of the Service, traversing the twenty five Area Commands of the Service which are spread across the country, and whose major responsibility is to source Intelligence that will guide the operations of the NCS. Purposive sampling were also used to conduct oral interviews and distribute questionnaire to some key respondents like the Head of Customs Intelligence Unit and officers in the Nigerian Army, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Immigration Service, National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control and Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON), to elicit firsthand information. In relations to the subject under investigation, this had proved to be a veritable source of information/data for the research endeavour.

Methodology

The study adopts both qualitative and quantitative approach.

Qualitative method: This is based on logical analysis. The methodology enables the researcher to get to know the social world being studied by exploring secondary data collected from books, articles, journals, newsletters, publications from Nigeria Customs Services websites, as well as publications from the websites of other sister agencies. Oral interview is also conducted among the CIU officers for the purpose of eliciting firsthand information. These sources of data are therefore maximized for the purpose of thorough and empirical analyses.

Quantitative Method: This involves the use of questionnaire in which a total number of one hundred and seventy eight (178) copies of questionnaire were distributed to officers in the Head of Customs Intelligence Unit, Nigerian Army, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Immigration Service, National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control and Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON) to elicit information. However, only one hundred and forty two (142, 80%) copies of the questionnaire distributed were retrieved.

Literature Review or Conceptual Review

Moreover, in the course of this research, relevant literature were explored and interrogated for proper analysis. Hutton (2010) for example has attributed the persistent need for cooperation

among intelligence officers involved in the intelligence cycle processes to globalisation of criminal activities and increasingly trans-nationalization of intelligence network community, which considerably has widened the horizon of intelligence sharing and information exchange. According to him, this is based on the recognition that the traditional manner of thinking and conducting intelligence is no longer useful to counter risks associated with insecurity. The traditional intelligence paradigm, which only became a formalised global norm in the post-World War II era, was based on the development of critical information through a national, classified system of collection and analysis (George, 2007). Hutton further explained that intelligence gathers information (from all sources) on a specified threat in order to be able to better apply the tools of power to counter such threats. The evolution of an intelligence function has in general been associated with contestation for power and influence be it against domestic or foreign enemies, generally confined within a state-centric security paradigm.

Consequently, changes in the security paradigm have resulted in changes in the manner in which threats to security are interpreted and coordinated through major intelligence cycle components and phases for positive national security outcomes. These threats are geographically unbounded and many of them cannot be countered through military or security means. Furthermore, the threats to traditional state security have also changed and have become largely transnational in nature. Cavelti and Mauer (2009) stated that the new spectrum of threats is dominated by three interrelated characteristics, which are complexity, uncertainty and a diminishing impact of geographical space. According to them, increased complexity results in increased uncertainty. Increase in uncertainty also results in the demand for information. As the importance of national borders become challenged and the compression of space and time opens opportunities and vulnerabilities for the global security order, security actors are challenged to evolve to remain relevant to this new global security paradigm. When referring to transnational threats, the primary assumption is that the concern is with security vulnerabilities that transcend national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent. Hutton vehemently opined that the transnational nature of security and the diversity of the security paradigm issues have driven intelligence cooperation in the intelligence cycle processes to a higher priority (Hutton, 2010).

On the other hand, Bartes (2013) has observed that despite differences in the conceptualisation of the Intelligence Cycle, its various components namely; planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, consumption, evaluation and feedback, are the same. More importantly, scholars have also suggested different configurations of the intelligence cycle with some processes standing out as important features that reoccur; thus, processes such as collection, analysis, and dissemination are intelligence processes that are not deemed unnecessary by various intelligence cycles. For instance, Stokes (2013) indicated that the intelligence cycle is a five-step process which includes 1) Planning and Direction, 2) Collection, 3) Processing, 4) Production, and 5) Dissemination. However, Robert (2004) described the intelligence cycle as a six-step process which includes 1) Requirements, needs, 2) Planning, direction, 3) Collection, 4) Processing, 5) Analysis, and 6) Dissemination. In addition, Stokes (2013) notes a seven step intelligence process from the Naval Postgraduate School Centre for Homeland Defence and Security's Course NS414 which includes 1)

Requirements, 2) Collection, 3) Process and Exploitation, 4) Analysis and Production, 5) Dissemination, 6) Consumption and 7) Feedback.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) while corroborating Robert (2004) stance asserts that the intelligence cycle “is the process of developing unrefined data into polished intelligence for the use of policymakers. They also affirm that intelligence cycle consists of six steps, which are: requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination. These steps are perpetually linked, in other words, intelligence uncovered at one step may require going back to an earlier step before moving forward”. Requirements refer to ascertained information needs, which have been set by policy or by administrators, which may be an on-going process. Planning and Direction is the next process and it is a concerted effort that ensures that information need requirements are matched with the deliverables in order to ensure that consumers are satisfied. Collection is aggregation of information from different sources while relying on diverse sources of information; while adopting different techniques. Processing and Exploitation engage in the conversion of information gathered into usable forms by analysts. Analysts make use of methods such as decryption, language translations, and data reduction; while processing involves entering raw data into databases so that it can be exploited for use in the analysis process. Furthermore, analysis and production is the transformation of information into intelligence through integration, evaluation, and analysis of data. During this process, the relevance, validity and reliability of information are considered. In addition, information is contextualised and integrated to produce intelligence. Finally, dissemination is the last step and it refers to the distribution of raw or finished intelligence to the consumers whose information needs brought about the intelligence requirements. This process can thereafter be carried out through the use of Reports, Bulletins, and Assessments. It should be noted that disseminated intelligence usually influences decisions, hence ensuring that new requirements are created, thereby repeating the processes in the intelligence cycle.

According to the Central Intelligence Agency (2013), the first process in its intelligence cycle is planning and direction, which entails making arrangements in respect of what is done and how to carry out the tasks. They itemize the information that are required and determine the best means to gather them. In addition, the collection process involves covert or overt means of gathering information through reading foreign newspapers, magazines, articles, listening to foreign radio, and watching overseas television broadcasts. Covert collection of information involves the use of listening devices and hidden cameras and satellite photography. Furthermore, processing of intelligence refers to turning raw information gathered into actionable information which can be turned to reports. Analysis and production is the next stage which involves paying closer attention to all the information gathered and determining how they can be seamlessly integrated, and lastly, dissemination which is the final step which ensures that the final written analysis is given to a policymaker, who initiated the activities in the intelligence cycle (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts Thomas Kilmann's conflict mode instrument (TKI) which was developed in 1976. The theory defines individual's behaviour along five specific modes, which was based upon the two separate dimensions of cooperation and assertiveness: competing is assertive and uncooperative, collaborating is assertive and cooperative, avoiding is unassertive and uncooperative, accommodating is unassertive and cooperative, and compromising is intermediate in both cooperatives and assertiveness.

Cooperation and assertiveness relates to the relationship that should exists between law enforcement agencies like the Nigeria customs service and her stakeholders at the Borders Local Community; clearing agents etc. while the NCS is expected to cooperate with the Border Community, she is also expected to assert herself in line with her statutory functions in situations where laws are being breached. Also, competing comes into play where law Enforcement Agencies refuse to see themselves as partners in progress but as competitors, with an agency trying to outwit another. This is a conflictual behaviour that should be discouraged, while collaborating is cooperative and should be a welcome development amongst sister security/regulatory agencies of government. Accommodating is also unassertive and cooperative, while avoiding is uncooperative and should be discouraged amongst Agencies of Government. The theory has a tendency of leading to a win-win outcome amongst stakeholders, while also reinforcing mutual trust and respect. Also, the theory has the potential of building a foundation for effective collaboration amongst parties' agencies in the nearest future with profound implications for thoroughness in intelligence cycle processes.

However, Thomas and Kilmann's theory has the following identified weaknesses. Firstly, the theory requires a commitment from all parties which it takes for granted, before a mutually acceptable solution or resolution could be arrived at amongst all parties. Secondly, the process of cooperation, accommodating, assertiveness etc., takes a lot of time and energy and may not be as easy as it is presented. Thirdly, the process of collaborating may not be practical when timing is crucial and a quick solution is required. Fourthly, and lastly is that some Agencies may decide to take advantage of other agencies desire to collaborate with others. This may negatively affect the Agencies confidence and self-esteem in situations when firm enforcement actions are required.

Discussion of Findings

The finding of this study are summarized under two (2) major subheadings, in tandem with the research objectives, namely: intelligence cycle operation in the Nigeria Customs Service; and challenges of NCS intelligence cycle with regard to border security.

Qualitative Analysis of Intelligence Cycle Operation in the Nigeria Customs Services

The oral interview conducted are analysed in the table 1 and 2 below. In the table 1, three internal interviewees are the major respondents of the research question on the intelligence cycle used by the Nigeria Customs Service. The first interviewee affirms that the CIA model of Intelligence Cycle is adopted by the Nigeria Customs Service with an in-house modification, to show peculiarity of the Nigerian context. One of the interviewees indicates that intelligence cycle

is not forcefully implemented in the Nigeria Customs Service and it is the “prerogative of heads of border stations, patrol leaders and operational officers”. This implies that application of Intelligence Cycle might not be practical for field officers who might need to make decisions quickly.

The answers provided by the first interviewee vividly showed the kind of model being adopted by the Intelligence unit – the CIA model which according to the interviewee is actually a five stage model. Although the components of the CIA intelligence cycle model were not comprehensively highlighted, the gist had been speculated by accentuating on the intelligence cycle processes from analysis, enforcement to application. More so, Bartes’ (2013) findings demonstrated a five-phased intelligence cycle based on CIA model as follows:

1. Planning and direction of the intelligence cycle: This involves task definition, analysis and formulation of the problem, and planning the decision procedure.
2. Gathering information and conducting research
3. Information processing and storing
4. Intelligence analysis of information
5. Intelligence dissemination

Bartes’ view on intelligence cycle phases further corroborates the stance of the NCS through *Customs Reforms and Modernization Report* (2013). This report considerably elaborates the workability of intelligence cycle processes in the NCS Customs Intelligence Unit (CIU). Evidence abounds that the NCS CIU is charged with the task of identifying threats (Planning and direction) and gathering information (Collection) for the purposes of increasing revenue and fighting illegal smuggling operations. It must be emphasised that this idea is achieved through a network of intelligence informants and investigative works such as surveillance, research, analysing data and documentation, and monitoring the work of other officers and agents within NCS. The works of this category of network intelligence officers cover gathering information and conducting research, information processing and storing as well as intelligence analysis. CIU and its officers also use the contacts they have developed with other countries and their border agencies, as well as the World Customs Organization (WCO) and its Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices (RILO) network.

Worldwide, the RILO network comprises eleven different offices covering the WCO’s six regions. The individual offices serve as regional centres for compiling emerging trends, methods, routes, and significant cases, for analysis and distribution to appropriate agencies. NCS taps into this wealth of information through CIU, allowing the Service to keep abreast of the latest methods used to subvert customs procedures. This network of offices uses the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN), a worldwide database created by the WCO. The Customs Intelligence Unit uses CEN and the RILO network to spot new ways of smuggling, as well as verify information received from other sources. It also helps track movements of suspicious shipments and co-ordinate efforts to find not only the goods, but the perpetrators as well. CIU officers, in collecting data and information, work independently with their carefully cultivated contacts, but may not unilaterally decide upon the seizure of a particular shipment. The decision

to seize a shipment is made only after careful consultation with HQ and with the CAC of the port in question.

Table 1: Intelligence Cycle in Use by the Nigeria Customs Service

Interviewees	Comments
The First Interviewee (Internal)	(1) “We utilize the CIA model which is actually a five stage model of intelligence cycle, though with a lot of moderation to give a Nigerian content” (2) “you analyse it” “enforcement” “we apply it”
The Second Interviewee (Internal)	(1) “...this is the prerogative of heads of border stations, patrol leaders and operational officers”
The Third Interviewee (Internal)	(1) “I make sure that I disseminate them timely and I get feedback”

Source: Field Data from Transcribed PIs (2018)

On the other hand, the second interviewee highlighted the imperativeness of intelligence cycle among security officers like the heads of border stations, patrol leaders and operational officers. While the third interviewee gave a hint on the last stage of the intelligence cycle. However, the answer provided by the first interviewee demonstrated a specialist knowledge of the kind of model and stages in the intelligence cycle. The view which hitherto has been substantiated in the literature review. For instance, Stokes (2013) has argued that the intelligence cycle based on CIA model is a five-step process which includes 1) Planning and Direction, 2) Collection, 3) Processing, 4) Production, and 5) Dissemination. More so, each of the five-step processes had been summarized by the Central Intelligence Agency (2013) thus:

The first process in its intelligence cycle is planning and direction, which entails making arrangements in respect of what is done and how to carry out the tasks. They itemize the information that are required and determine the best means to gather them. In addition, the collection process involves covert or overt means of gathering information through reading foreign newspapers, magazines, articles,

listening to foreign radio, and watching overseas television broadcasts. Covert collection of information involves the use of listening devices and hidden cameras and satellite photography. Furthermore, processing of intelligence refers to turning raw information gathered into actionable information which can be turned to reports. Analysis and production is the next stage which involves paying closer attention to all the information gathered and determining how they can be seamlessly integrated, and lastly, dissemination which is the final step which ensures that the final written analysis is given to a policymaker, who initiated the activities in the intelligence cycle (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).

Indeed, the information provided particularly by the first internal interviewee clarified all forms of differences in the configuration and conceptualisation of the Intelligence Cycle as hitherto indicated by the idea of Robert's (2004) six-step process of the intelligence cycle and the Naval Postgraduate School Centre for Homeland Defence and Security's Course NS414 seven-step intelligence process in the literature review. The first interviewee clarified these differences by indicating five-step process of the intelligence cycle which is in tandem with the idea of Stokes' CIA five-step process of the intelligence cycle.

Furthermore, Young (2018) while corroborating US. Department of Navy's stance have argued thus:

No single phase of the cycle is more important than the others. All of the phases are interdependent. Without proper direction, the other phases will not focus on the correct objectives. Without effective collection, there may be too much or too little information and what information there is may prove to be irrelevant. Without processing and production, there is a mass of random data instead of the knowledge needed for the planning and execution of operations. Intelligence is meaningless unless it reaches the right people in time to affect the decision-making process and in an understandable form.

The above assertion accentuates the indispensable nature of each component of the intelligence cycle process. This further implies the need for proper coordination and integration of every bit of the intelligence stages for positive outcomes with regard to border security. In other words, improper planning and decisive direction on the part of the intelligence officers right from the first stage can result to failure in the other intelligence cycle processes.

Quantitative Analysis of Intelligence Cycle Operation in the Nigeria Customs Services

Table 2 and Fig. 1 shown that the in house model intelligence cycle is mainly adopted by the Nigerian Customs Services (n= 123, 86.6 per cent), though many stated that they use the CIA

(n= 39, 27.5 per cent); while very few indicated they use the intelligence cycle of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and that of the U.S. Navy (n= 6, 4.2 per cent).


Table 2: Intelligence Cycle in Use by the Nigeria Customs Services

Items	Yes	No
In house designed Model (designed by your organization)	123(86.6%)	19(13.4%)
CIA	39(27.5%)	103(72.5%)
FBI	22(15.5%)	120(84.5%)
U.S. Air Force	6(4.2%)	136(95.8%)
U.S. Army	6(4.2%)	136(95.8%)
U.S. Marine Corps	6(4.2)	136(95.8%)
U.S. Navy	6(4.2)	136(95.8%)

Source: Field Data, 2018.

N= 142

Fig. 1: Intelligence Cycle in Use by the Nigeria Customs Services



Data from PIs revealed that the Intelligence Cycle adopted was in-house in nature but had features of the CIA model of Intelligence Cycle. Data from the questionnaire also affirm this when majority stated that an in house model intelligence cycle was mainly adopted by the Nigerian Customs Services (n= 123, 86.6 per cent), although many indicated that they used the CIA (n= 39, 27.5 per cent). This implies that the Nigeria Customs Service Intelligence Model is an in-house design but shares more similarities with the CIA Intelligence Cycle.

The intelligence cycle in use by an Agency goes beyond what has been tagged an academic illustration of intelligence activities (Arthur 2006). The efficacy of the intelligence cycle process lies in the primacy of the components of the intelligence cycle itself. The basic intelligence cycle process shows serialized steps that are important for assembling information so as to have expected understanding and enlightenment. Hutton (2010) opines that intelligence departments are expected to gather information from all sources on a specified issue in order to be able to better apply the tools of power to counter such threats. The findings reached in the research endeavour concerning the process and procedure engaged in intelligence cycle conforms with the position of Stokes (2013) in which the intelligence cycle was tagged to be a five step process, starting with planning and direction, collection, processing & exploitation, Analysis and production, then finally terminating in dissemination. This has much similarities with the CIA model, though findings has revealed that it is an in – house model. Designing an in-house model confers a lot of advantages or strength on the cycle. Resendez (2013) argues that confidentiality, integrity and availability are some of the strength derivable from an in-house intelligence cycle designed by an Agency. However, reaping this benefits to the fullest, requires the hiring of analysts or training of some intelligence officers in the science of analysis. The Nigerian Customs Service as presently constituted do not have professional intelligence analysts. This has very far reaching implications.

Inherent Challenges of Intelligence Cycle in the Nigeria Customs Service

Various scholars like Adekanye (1998), Babatunde (2009), Wali (2010), Odoma (2014), Okereke (2016), Adaramodu (2016) among many others have explored the inherent challenges within the intelligence operations and processes in Nigeria. Babatunde (2009), for instance, had attributed the inadequacies in the areas of coordination and sharing of information between agencies to low level of technological capacity and priority settings. He enumerated some of these problems as lack of computerized system to analyse digitized fingerprints in the country and lack of communication link between the airports and the borders except through the GSM. Similarly, *Customs Reform and Modernization* (2013) has vividly indicated that “while CIU enjoys access to information, it still relies on outdated technology, in respect of both surveillance and communication equipment”. Therefore, lack of sophisticated technology has considerably made CIU to lag behind the smugglers.

Furthermore, this is coupled with unsafe communication system with regard to information exchange and sharing. In this wise, Adekanye (1998), Wali (2010), Odoma (2014), Okereke (2016) and Adaramodu (2016) have identified issues like unhealthy inter-agency rivalry and lack of synergy/information sharing which had sowed seeds of mutual distrusts especially in the conduct of inter-agencies operations. Inter-agency rivalry constitutes an inherent challenge of inter-agency cooperation along border post in Nigeria. According to Omogui (2006:66), agency rivalry is a state of competition, contention or emulation that exist within and between agencies for something of perceived value to the contending interest. This could be tangible or intangible recognition and other perceived ‘benefits to self-esteem’ which can be positive (good natured) or negative (associated with injurious consequence, for instance the inability to cooperate optimally in support of national defence and security objective). Bagdanos (2004) and Adekanye (1998)

contends that rivalry could be due to differing individual perspectives, new strategic concept, powerful functional and regional orientations, and technological initiatives, with each having differing force structure implications.

In the same vein, Olusegun Adeniyi (2013) has linked the fundamental problem of border security and intelligence cycle processes in the NCS CIU to institutional fragmentation, inefficient intelligence dissemination and utilization system and non-coordination of policy between and among security agencies. Indeed, these challenges are real and must be addressed for border security and intelligence cycle processes to be effective. More importantly, their in-house intelligence cycle model need to be clearly defined in context and scope to afford obscurity and to remove all form of doubts with regard to whether NCS uses in-house or CIA model and for other ardent researchers in the field of intelligence and border security to adequately tapped into it for the purpose of promoting and sustaining national security interests.

Conclusion

The study so far has been able to demonstrate that the Nigeria Customs Service CIU intelligence cycle is an in-house model which follows the pattern of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It is an in-house model because it was specifically designed by the CIU of the NCS with considerable adaptation of the US CIA model. The major activities in the NCS intelligence cycle, and as affirmed by the *Customs Reform and Modernization Report (2013)*, range from planning and direction, gathering and research, information processing and storing, intelligence analysis and dissemination and utilization. This pattern represents the major intelligence cyclical processes in the NCS by which their basic intelligence functions and responsibilities of maintaining border posts' threats are executed. However, based on the research findings, the paper sees the need for more advancement in the NCS intelligence model due to some pronounced challenges. It therefore advocates for more advanced computer technology, interagency cooperation and trust, and the recruitment of professional intelligence analysts. This is crucial in order to secure an effective and practicable intelligence cycle processes in the NCS that would be devoid of major inherent challenges.

Recommendations

Based on the foregoing arguments, the following recommendations are made:

- The Nigeria Customs Service needs to design its own identifiable intelligence cycle which gives credence to its peculiarities while also noting the importance of designing a model that is adaptable to changes especially in terms of complex intelligence environment which may not necessarily follow sequential order.
- Advanced online and social media technology that will permeate the distribution of Intelligence as widely as possible, so that it can be evaluated and commented upon by experts other than the collectors themselves for accuracy and efficiency.
- More professional intelligence analysts must be recruited as any intelligence cycle model cannot function effectively without them.

- The level of cooperation between the NCS and other security agencies should be addressed. This is because the work of protecting the border is enormous and may be difficult to achieve by the NCS alone, hence policy makers should ensure that inter-agency rivalry and inter-agency superiority are reduced or eliminated; by doing this, intelligence sharing between agencies will improve and will in turn improve border security. To achieve this, more interaction through seminars, lectures and workshops should be encouraged between the Services to foster the spirit of togetherness and reduce friction or competition.
- There must be an external review body on the activities of the security agencies. This will require a strong political will and higher degree of cooperation and coordination in Intelligence surveillance and monitoring.

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